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COMMENTS
JUSTICE WHITE'S CHEMISTRY: THE
MITCHELLIZATION OF FUENTES
In the course of four decisions over the past six years, the United
States Supreme Court has sought to construct a constitutional framework for the prejudgment accommodation of the conflicting rights of
creditors and debtors in the context of both secured and unsecured
financial transactions. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,' the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute permitting
prejudgment wage garnishment without notice or opportunity for

hearing.2 Three years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin,3 the Court, in a 4-3
decision, 4 found violative of the due process clause Florida and Penn-

sylvania replevin5 statutes which provided for issuance, upon the secured party's ex parte application, of a writ authorizing seizure by
state agents of the alleged debtor's property. 6 While recognizing some
of the interests of the secured conditional sales vendor, the Court held
that procedural due process requires "some form of notice and hear-

ing' 7 prior to deprivation of not merely property over which the alleged debtor has clear title (as in Sniadach), but of any significant
"property interest that 'cannot be characterized as de minimis.' " The

1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Decisions in the wake of Sniadach have extended its ruling
to*encompass prejudgment attachment and garnishment generally. See, e.g., Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (replevin of bed, mattress
and household goods); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. App. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13,
96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972) (prejudgment attachment
of debtor's. checking account); Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972)
(attachment of automobile). Commentators have also urged a broad interpretation of
Sniadach. See generally Smith, Sniadach and Summary Procedures: The Constitution
Comes to the Marketplace, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 300, 307-13 (1972).
2. The "opportunity to be heard" should include a determination of the probable
validity of the creditor's claim against the alleged debtor before deprivation of the subject property or restriction of its use. 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
4. Justice Stewart, writing the opinion of the Court, was joined by Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall. Justice White, dissenting, was joined by Justices Burger and
Blackmun. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the decision.
5. Replevin is a personal action by which the owner, or one who has a specific property interest in chattel taken or detained, seeks to recover possession in specie. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1463-64 (4th ed. 1968).

6.
hold
7.
8.

Both of the cases consolidated for review by the Court involved personal housegoods.
407 U.S. at 90 n.21, citing Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id., quoting Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Fuentes Court relied on Sniadach, stressing the inadequacy of the statutory protections afforded the debtor. The Court did not attempt to
balance the creditor's property interests against those of the debtor. 9
Two years after Fuentes, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Louisiana's sequestration statutes' ° in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,"1
a case involving facts nearly identical to those in Fuentes.12 Writing
for the plurality, Justice White, author of the dissenting opinion in
Fuentes,13 distinguished that ruling by noting that the Louisiana statutes at issue in Mitchell provided numerous safeguards not present in
Fuentes: the writ of sequestration was issuable only by a judge, rather
than a court clerk; 14 the writ would issue only upon a clear showing of
entitlement, rather than a mere conclusory allegation of ownership

9.

Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart stated:
The replevin was not cast as a final judgment. Most, if not all, of the appellants
lacked full title to the chattels; and their claim even to continued possession was a
matter of dispute . . . . Nonetheless, it is clear, that the appellants were deprived
of possessory interests in those chattels that were within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "property,"
however, has never been interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed
ownership. Rather it has been read broadly to extend protection to "any significant
property interest."
407 U.S. at 84, 86. The term "property interests" refers to current and real interests that
both buyer and seller may have in the property at issue. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600, 604 (1974). Under a conditional sales contract or security agreement, the subject property is not exclusively owned by the debtor until the purchase price is paid in
full. Id. The creditor has an interest measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase
price. Id.
10. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. arts. 3501 etseq. (1960).
Sequestration is a mesne process by which a writ is issued at the commencement of or pending an action, enabling the claimant to have property in the possession of the defendant or a third person taken into legal custody until after
judgment so that the property may be delivered to the party adjudged to be
entitled to it, where the defendant has the power to place the claimant in a disadvantageous position and the claim is against the particular property.
Johnson, Attachment and Sequestration: Provisional Remedies Under the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, 38 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963) (footnote omitted).
11. 416U.S.600(1974).
12. In both Fuentes and Mitchell creditors sought repossession of personal household goods after an alleged default by the debtor under a conditional sales contract with
security agreement. In each case, the creditor proceeded by judicial repossession, rather
than self-help, utilizing the sheriff's services without giving prior notice and an opportunity for hearing.
13. Justice White was joined in Mitchell by the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist. Justice Powell concurred in a separate opinion but appeared to join also
in the majority opinion. Dissenting Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Douglas and
Marshall. Justice Brennan dissented in a separate opinion.
14. Orleans Parish, in which Mitchell arose, was at that time the only parish in
Louisiana which confined the authority to issue writs to a judge. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. art.
281 (1960).
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rights;' 5 the applicant creditor was required to demonstrate that it was
"within the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose of or waste the
property";' 6 even upon issuance of the writ, the property was not repossessed by the creditor but was sequestered by the court pending
trial on the merits; 17 and finally, the statute authorized the debtor to
immediately request a dissolution of the writ.18 In contrast to the approach of the Fuentes Court, Justice White balanced the conflicting
property interests' 9 of both creditor and debtor, and held that the
Louisiana statutory procedure constitutionally accommodated all such
20
interests.
Most recently, eight months after Mitchell, the Court held unconsti15. The nature of the claim, the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon
for issuance of the writ must clearly appear from specific facts. Id. art. 3501.
16. Id. art. 3571. It is interesting to note that historically the writ would issue "only
if the creditor had 'good reason to fear' that the debtor would damage, alienate or waste
the goods, and the creditor was required to show the grounds for such fear." 416 U.S. at
605 n.4.
17. In Louisiana, the creditor is required to post a bond prior to issuance of the
writ, to protect the debtor from unlawful sequestration. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. arts. 3501,
3574 (1960). After a sequestration writ is served upon the debtor, the sheriff becomes
responsible for the property's safekeeping. The creditor, however, may take possession
of the goods if the debtor does not post a bond within 10 days to secure possession. Id.
arts. 3507, 3576. The creditor may not sell the goods until final judgment on tie merits.
Id. art. 3510. For further discussion, see Johnson, supra note 10, at 21-22.
18. LA. CODE CiV. PRO. art. 3506 (1960). Dissolution of the writ must be ordered
unless the creditor proves the grounds on which the writ was issued. Mitchell filed a motion to dissolve the writ, claiming that the seizure violated the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions since it had occurred without prior notice and hearing.
416 U.S. at 602-03. The motion was denied by the trial judge who stated:
[P] laintiff insured defendant's right to due process by proceeding in accordance
with Louisiana law as opposed to any type of self-help seizure which would have
denied defendant possession of his property without due process.
Id. at 603. The trial judge's decision was later affirmed in turn by the Louisiana Court of
Appeals and the state supreme court. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So.
2d 186 (1972); see Note, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv.43, 73 n.18
(1973).
19. Property interests were not the only interests balanced by the Mitchell Court.
See discussion in Part II-A infra.
20. What set Mitchell apart from Sniadach and Fuentes was that the protections afforded the debtor by Louisiana law were deemed sufficient by the Court, after balancing, to alleviate the need for the imposition of further safeguards such as prior notice
and hearing. This flexible-interests-balancing approach adopted by the Court is characteristic of traditional due process adjudication. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1960) (balancing the
nature of the government function with the private interest affected by it; interest of civilian employee in retaining his job can be summarily denied when balanced against the
necessity of security of a military base); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66
(1970) (balancing the interests of welfare recipients in receiving their benefits without
being placed in "brutal need" with the government's interest in promoting an efficient
system and the welfare of the general public by declining to give benefits to those not
entitled to them).
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tutional a Georgia garnishment statute2 1 in North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,2 2 which involved prejudgment garnishment by
an unsecured creditor of defendant corporation's bank account. Like
the statutes at issue in Fuentes, the Georgia statute was relatively devoid of debtor safeguards except for bond and counterbond provisions,23 and a requirement that the creditor show "reason to apprehend the loss of the [amount due] or some part thereof unless process
of garnishment shall issue." 24 Justice White, writing for a 6-3 Court
(Justice Powell concurring only in the judgment 25), relied on Fuentes
to find that the Georgia statutory procedure was unconstitutional for
lack of an "early hearing" 26 at which the creditor would be required
to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment.2 7 Justice
White also noted that the Georgia statute had "none of the saving
28
characteristics of the Louisiana statute" in Mitchell.
This comment will explore the interaction of these four major
cases, and interpret their composite message to the secured creditor. It
initially will analyze the various opinions of Justice White, concentrating particularly on the roles of stare decisis and supremacy in DiChem, and of Justice Powell, particularly his emphasis upon distinguishing secured from unsecured transactions. Second, the comment
will discuss the three basic remedies available to the secured creditor:
the adversary hearing under Fuentes, self-help repossession, and the
ex parte procedure under Mitchell. Mitchell's due process balancing
analysis is favored as an appropriate compromise between self-help on
the one hand and Fuentes' stringent adversary hearing requirement on
the other, in the context of secured transactions. Finally, the comment
will discuss current developments in this area in Washington, and pre-

21. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101 et seq. (1974).
22. 419 U.S. 60 (1975).
23. Id. at 606.
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974), quoted in 419 U.S. at 602-03 n.l.
25. 419 U.S. at 609.
26. Justice White referred variously, in discussing the Georgia statute's infirmity
under Fuentes, to "hearing," "hearing or other safeguard," and "early hearing." In distinguishing Mitchell, he noted the lack of a "provision for an early hearing at which the
creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment."
419 U.S. at 607. Despite the ambiguity of these references, it is submitted that in DiChem,as in Sniadach, the statutory scheme was infirm for failure to provide a pre-seizure adversary hearing in the context of unsecured transactions. See notes 57-58 and
accompanying text infra.
27. 419 U.S. at 607.
28. Id. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra.

904

Creditors' Rights
sent a proposed statutory amendment to comport with Mitchell's
guidelines.
I.
A.

STARE DECISIS AND SUPREMACY: FUENTES
REVITALIZED, MITCHELL REAFFIRMED
Justice White's Attempt for Greater Unity

In his dissenting opinion in Fuentes, Justice White noted: "It goes
without saying that in the typical installment sale of personal property
both seller and buyer have interests in the property until the purchase
price is fully paid ....
-29 Writing for the majority in Mitchell, Jus30
recognized:
tice White similarly
Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered by
the court is exclusively the property of the defendant debtor ....
The reality is that both seller and buyer had current, real interests in
the property.
Proceeding from this recognition in Mitchell, Justice White balanced
the parties' property interests in the sequestered goods with their interests in due process, and found that the Louisiana procedure effected
"'a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the
parties." 3 ' Although Justice White could have regarded Mitchell as an
"extraordinary situation" constituting an exception to the Fuentes
rule,32 he chose not to do so. Rather he carved out yet another exception to the Fuentes due process requirements 33 based on factual distinctions between the statutory schemes.
29. 407 U.S. at 99.
30. 416 U.S. at 604.
31. Id. at 607
32. In Fuentes,407 U.S. at 91-92, the Court outlined the limited circumstances in
which it has allowed summary seizures:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for
prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was
necessary and justified in the particular instance.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found Mitchell within the Fuentes exceptions, noting
that where the creditor can show there is an immediate danger that the debtor will
destroy or conceal the goods, seizure before notice and hearing may be justified. W. T.
Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972). Justice White, however,
noticeably disregarded this analysis.
33. After Fuentes, one commentary suggested that four elements must necessarily
be present before Fuentes' procedural due process safeguards come into play: (1) the
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Certainly Justice White, in Mitchell, made good his dissenting
comment in Fuentes that he "would not ignore, as the Court does, the
creditor's interest in preventing further use and deterioration of the
property in which he has a substantial interest. 34 Indeed, four
Justices 35 and some commentators 36 felt that Fuentes was overruled
by Mitchell. Yet Justice White's recent opinion in Di-Chem suggests
that "report [s] of the demise of Fuentes . . . have been greatly exag37

gerated.
Although before Mitchell was decided the commentary was generally favorable to Fuentes,3 8 that opinion experienced rough sledding
in the inferior courts. In Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer,3 9 the Arizona Supreme Court found unnecessary prior notice and an opportunity for hearing in attachment and garnishment proceedings when
wages were not involved. In an opinion reminiscent of that of the Virginia Court of Appeals in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,40 the Arizona
41
court refused to abide by the principles set forth in Fuentes:
Admittedly, were we convinced that the four man majority of the
United States Supreme Court in Fuentes

.

.

. would become at least a

five man majority when the two judges who did not participate in the
particular case are called up to participate in a similar question, we
would then be inclined to follow the decision as set down in Fuentes
... . When, however, we have doubts that once the full court hears
the case that the opinion will stand, we are reluctant to declare unconstitutional Arizona statutes based upon a decision by less than a clear
majority.

creditor seeks to deprive the debtor of a substantial property interest; (2) there is no
compelling state or creditor interest justifying summary taking; (3) state action is involved in the deprivation; and (4) the debtor has not waived his or her constitutional
rights. Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes & Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 363 (1973).
34. 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
35. Powell, Stewart, Douglas and Marshall. 416 U.S. at 623, 635.
36.

See, e.g., Comment, Changing Concepts of Consumer Due Process in the Su-

preme Court-The New Conservative Majority Bids Farewell to Fuentes, 60 IowA L.
REV. 262, 286 (1974): "Analysis of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
in Mitchell makes it clear that Fuentes v. Shevin has been overruled."
37. 419 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. See, e.g., Note, ProceduralDue Process and Washington's Prejudgment Seizure
Procedures,48 WASH. L. REV. 646 (1973); Clark & Landers, supra note 33; Note, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 85 (1972).

39.
40.
41.
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The Arizona court has been severely (and properly) criticized for its
refusal to follow precedent; 42 yet the Supreme Court itself in Mitchell
showed little more respect for stare decisis than had the Arizona court
for the supremacy clause. As Justice Stewart, author of the Fuentes
43
opinion, stated in his Mitchell dissent:
It seems to me that unless we respect the constitutional decisions of
this Court, we can hardly expect that others will do so . . . . [T] he
Court today has unmistakenly overruled a considered decision of this
Court that is barely two years old, without pointing to any change
• . . that might justify this total disregard of stare decisis.
The Georgia Supreme Court in Di-Chem upheld its garnishment
statute by interpreting Sniadach as a limited exception in favor of
wage earners to "the general rule of legality of garnishment statutes."' 44 Ruling without the benefit of Mitchell, the Georgia court, like
the Arizona court, failed to give due regard to the governing principles
45
of Fuentes.
Thus in Di-Chem the Court was squarely confronted with the unreserved refusal of an inferior tribunal to follow the supreme law of the
land, as enunciated in Fuentes.46 Justice White's reliance upon Fuentes, an opinion with which he personally disagreed, demonstrates
without doubt the insistence of the Court that its rulings be obeyed.
Moreover, that reliance reflects in no small measure the Court's
42. See, e.g., 86 HARv. L. REv. 1307 (1973), in which the author notes that if all
lower courts began a study in personalities of the Supreme Court Justices, the result
would be quagmires of uncertainty, uneven application of constitutional and federal
law, and the opportunity for judges to adjust their "predictions" to suit their individual
views. Congress has provided that six Justices constitute a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 1
(1970). The Court not only hands down four member decisions, but recognizes their
precedential value and finds it necessary to follow or distinguish them. See 86 HARV. L.
REv. at 1312.
43. 416 U.S. at 634-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. 231 Ga. 260, 264, 201 S.E.2d 321,323 (1973).
45. In this respect the Georgia court was not without supporters on the Court. In
their dissenting opinion in Di-Chem, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist stated that
Fuentes should not have been decided by a 4-3 vote when Justices filling the vacant
seats were qualified and available to participate on reargument. 419 U.S. at 616. In addition, they stated that they could not regard Fuentes as much influence or precedent for
the Di-Chem case. Id. at 615-16. They would have affirmed, by distinguishing Sniadach
as "reek[ing] of wages," id. at 619, and deciding that since debtor North Georgia Finishing was an operating corporation, the Georgia system afforded all the protections
required by commercial entities.
46. While the Mitchell Court was aware of the challenge presented by the Arizona
court, see 416 U.S. at 634 (Stewart, J., dissenting), the problem was not squarely before
the Court. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court properly deferred to Fuentes, but purported to distinguish it. See note 32 supra. Perhaps for this reason, the Mitchell Court
preferred not to address the problem.
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mindfulness of Justice Stewart's exhortation in Mitchell that the Court
itself respect its own constitutional decisions. 47 That Justice White, rather
than one of the four Justices forming the majority in Fuentes, wrote
the opinion of the Court in Di-Chem adds significantly to the impact
of its holding. His decision in Di-Chem to join in a majority decision, rather than to concur in the judgment and file a separate opinion
similar in approach to that of Justice Powell (as his personal views on
the substantive issues would dictate), represents praiseworthy magnanimity.
Most difficult for Justice White was the task of preserving the reach
of his own opinion in Mitchell, while at the same time revitalizing
Fuentes. Once having espoused reliance upon Fuentes, Justice White
could ill afford to ignore his own opinion in Mitchell, for to do so
48
would have implicitly relegated it to its own narrow factual setting.
Hence, Justice White proceeded to treat Mitchell as equally applicable
in the Di-Chem setting, finding the statutory scheme infirm under
Mitchell because of its total lack of safeguards. 4 9 His discussion of
Mitchell may lead the unwary observer to conclude that a statutory
scheme with only Mitchell safeguards might be constitutional in the
context of unsecured transactions, as in Di-Chem. Yet, reliance upon
Fuentes frustrates such analysis; Justice White's reliance on both
Fuentes and Mitchell suggests that Fuentes principles apply in the
context of unsecured transactions, and those of Mitchell in secured.
This reading of Di-Chem is harmonious with Justice White's earlier
opinions in Fuentes and Mitchell.
B.

The Secured-Unsecured Dichotomy and the Interrelationship
of Fuentes and Mitchell
The Mitchell Court introduced the use of a balancing test only in

47.

416 U.S. at 634.

48. Although concurring Justice Powell suggests that Justice White "relegate [d]
Mitchell to its narrow factual setting," 419 U.S. at 609, he overstates the case. Since the
Georgia statute at issue in Di-Chem did not require any kind of hearing, ex parte or
otherwise, prior to garnishment, Justice White had only to rely on Fuentes to the extent
that it required a hearing. Indeed, Justice White found the Georgia scheme infirm under
Fuentes for failure to provide for "an early hearing," id. at 606, and likewise infirm
under Mitchell for failure to provide for "an early hearing." Id. at 607. It is submitted,
then, that while apparently revitalizing Fuentes, Justice White has done so in such a
manner that Mitchell's reach is not one whit restricted. The secured creditor may proceed ex parte under the Mitchell standards after Di-Chem, just as before.
49. Id. at 607.
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the context of secured transactions, where there are mutual property
interests in goods. Where, as in the case of unsecured transactions, the
debtor has "full legal title"50 to the property in question, a balancing
approach is simply inappropriate. This suggests a meaningful distinction between secured and unsecured transactions for purposes of determining the requirements of due process. This approach finds doctrinal support in Justice White's opinion previously discussed, 5 1 and in
Justice Powell's concurring opinions in Mitchell and Di-Chem as well.
Justice Powell recognized that Sniadach was readily distinguishable
from Mitchell because the Sniadach creditor did not have a pre-existing property interest, as did the conditional sales vendor in Mitchell.5 2 He specifically noted the failure of the Fuentes Court to perceive
that a secured transaction necessarily involves mutual property inter53
ests, both entitled to protection.
Justice Powell again relied on this distinction in Di-Chem, expressing a continuing doubt whether Fuentes strikes a proper balance
when accounting for the creditor's interest.5 4 He would not, however,
use the dichotomy to restrict the use of Mitchell standards to secured
transaction disputes alone.5 5 His position accords more weight to the
creditor's "right" to invoke prejudgment garnishment and attachment
remedies than to the debtor's right to property to which he or she has
full legal title. Such a position represents an improper disregard for
the secured-unsecured dichotomy espoused by Justice Powell himself,
and seems at odds with the Court's opinions in both Mitchell and DiChem.
There are several reasons for restricting the application of Mitchell
to secured transaction disputes in states with appropriate statutory
schemes. First, property interests in goods have historically been re50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86.
Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 601; Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 601; Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97.
416 U.S. at 628 n.3.
Id.
419 U.S. at 609.

55. Unfortunately, Justice Powell does not make extensive use of the dichotomy in
fashioning different remedies. He seems to indicate that Mitchell-type safeguards would
satisfy procedural due process requirements, even with regard to unsecured transactions, if adequate security is provided by the creditor prior to garnishment or attachment, a specific factual showing of probable cause is made to a neutral official, and
there is an opportunity for a prompt post-seizure adversary hearing to determine the
merits of the controversy with the burden of proof on the creditor. Justice Powell would
find such procedures inadequate only when the debtor is financially driven "to the wall,"
as in Sniadach. See 419 U.S. at 609.
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garded as special and deserving of extra protection; 5 6 if prehearing
seizure were allowed in garnishment and attachment situations in
states with Mitchell-type statutes, the creditor would be taking property, without notice, in which only the debtor had an interest. Second,
such actions seem contrary to the recent trend, first surfacing in Sniadach, to grant greater protection to the debtor, long left unprotected
by older "creditor remedies" laws. A third, and perhaps the most convincing, reason is practical: While a judicial repossession scheme less
onerous than that outlined in Fuentes is essential to dissuade secured
creditors from using self-help repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),5 7 the self-help alternative is not available to the
unsecured creditor; judicial proceedings are the only option. Therefore, the need is not as great for a more flexible and less onerous alternative to encourage the unsecured creditor to use judicial alternatives.
Surveying the field at this point, and assuming some doctrinal and
practical validity to the secured-unsecured dichotomy, the following
picture is presented by Di-Chem, Mitchell, Fuentes and Sniadach:
Read together, Di-Chem, Fuentes and Sniadach suggest that states
will be required to provide for notice and opportunity for an adversary hearing prior to prejudgment garnishment (and by analogy attachment) 58 by an unsecured creditor. In the context of secured transactions Mitchell remains controlling even after Di-Chem. Should a
state fail to provide the full range of safeguards outlined in Mitchell
and reiterated in Di-Chem's discussion of Mitchell, it would then apparently be required to comply with the stricter Fuentes guidelines
governing judicial repossessions by unsecured creditors.

56. "Property and law were born together. and die together. Before laws were made
there was no property- take away laws and property ceases." J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF
LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL COoE, Part 1, 112 (Dumont ed., Hildreth transl.
1864). "[T] he right to private property is one of the pillars of western faith .... Private
property is an unmistakable index of social welfare." J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 6 (2d ed. 1975). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State...
shall . . . deprive any person of ... property without due process of law .... ");and

amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
57. UCC § 9-503; WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-503 (1974). Louisiana is the only
state which has not adopted the UCC; Maryland, Pennsylvania and Utah are the only
states which have enacted § 9-503 in a form different from the Official Code. For the
variations, see R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503(2), at
591 (1971).
58. See Rogoski v. Hammond, 9 Wn. App. 500, 513 P.2d 185 (1973), discussed in
note 144 and text accompanying notes 144-48 infra.
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II.

REMEDIES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO THE
SECURED CREDITOR

A.

Background: Conflicting Interests in Secured Transactions

The Mitchell Court made clear that the debtor and creditor have
conflicting interests in secured property. The debtor "owns" the goods
under the installment sales contract, but title is encumbered and, until
the purchase price is paid in full, the debtor's interest is no greater
than the surplus remaining after foreclosure and sale in the event of
default. The creditor has a corresponding interest in the property
measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase price, which is secured by a lien. 59
The Mitchell Court also identified interests other than the mutual
property interests which are present in the typical personal property
secured transaction. The debtor has the right to continued use and
possession of the goods if payments are current and has an interest in
avoiding a wrongful deprivation of the goods. 60 The creditor has an
interest in minimizing the diminishment of his or her security interest
caused by deterioration of the goods resulting from continued debtor
usage. The creditor may protect him or herself against the possibility
that the debtor will either dispose of the goods, causing the vendor's
lien to expire, 6 1 or abscond with them.
Looking first at the debtor's interests, aside from any interest in
legal title, it seems that his or her interests are not as great in the case
of repossession as in that of garnishment. In garnishment, either of
wages or of a bank account, the appropriation of a debtor's current
59. 416 U.S. at 604.
60. The Court in Mitchell indicated that the initial hardship to the debtor on repossession by the creditor was limited, since the debtor could immediately seek dissolution
of the writ which must be ordered unless the creditor proved the grounds upon which the
writ issued. 416 U.S. at 606; LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 3506 (1960). Even if the debtor neither sought a dissolution of the writ nor posted a redelivery bond, the seized property
could not be sold by the creditor until a final judgment on the merits was rendered. 416
U.S. at 622; LA. CODE Civ. PRO. arts. 3507, 3508, 3510 (1960). The Court indicated that
since the debtor in Mitchell did not avail himself of the right to request an immediate
full hearing on the matter of possession, he could hardly expect his claim of severe deprivation to carry much weight. 416 U.S. at 610.
61. Under Louisiana law, a vendor's privilege "exists on the price due on moveable
effects, if they are yet in the possession of the purchaser." LA. CODE CiV. PRO. art. 3217
(1960). By asserting this privilege, the creditor gains preference over other creditors of
the purchaser only if the property still remains in the possession of the purchaser. Id. art.
3227. Analogous situations do exist in UCC jurisdictions. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra.
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assets will inevitably cause substantial disruption of personal or business activities, and often will cause unmitigated hardship. Repossession of specific, previously-identified secured property will not ordinarily have such consequences. 62 The effect of repossession on the
debtor is more similar to that in the case of prejudgment attachment.
Yet in attachment, the sheriff typically levies on property worth 50
percent more than the amount claimed due, 63 and has considerable
discretion in choosing property to attach.6 4 Wrongful or oppressive
levy voids any subsequent proceeding only pro tanto, 65 and the debtor
must proceed affirmatively to obtain remedial relief from such attachment. 66 Since the secured creditor may proceed by repossession only
against specific secured property, the potential detriment to the debtor
is clearly less than in either garnishment or attachment proceedings.
Of the creditor's nonproperty interests, that of preventing deterioration of secured property is probably the least important. Deterioration
of some types of collateral, such as cars which have intrinsic resale
value, is perhaps of greater concern than deterioration of small appliances, clothing and other soft goods, which are often essentially
worthless as collateral. 67 Presumably, however, in the short time span
between notice to the debtor and judicial hearing, deterioration of collateral with intrinsic resale value will be only marginally significant.
The creditor's interest in preventing destruction or concealment of
secured goods seems more important than that of minimizing deterioration. The results of such activity are sufficiently harmful to the cred-

62. The repossession of consumer goods should not produce the extreme hardship
evidenced in the Sniadach garnishment situation. "The truly temporary deprivation of
the right to continue to use an automobile has no inherent characteristic of hardship."
Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 783 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Mentschikoff]. There is evidence, however, that the Supreme Court may consider
the use of an automobile to be of somewhat greater value. For example, "Once [driver's] licenses are issued, . . . their continued possession may become essential in the
pursuit of a livelihood." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); similarly, deprivation
of the use of cars can result in the loss of ajob which, no less than garnishment of wages.
can be disastrous for a wage-earning family. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341-42 (1969).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.090 (1974).
64. Id.
65. McConnell v. Kaufman, 5 Wash. 686,32 P. 782(1893).
66. Epley v. Hunter, 154 Wash. 163, 281 P. 327 (1929); McConnell v. Kaufman, 5
Wash. 686, 32 P. 782 (1893).
67. Mentschikoff, supra note 62, at 779 n.34.
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itor to justify serious consideration of this interest in the balancing
68

process.
The creditor's interest in preventing improper disposition of the collateral by the debtor is equally as important as preventing destruction
or concealment. This creditor interest is somewhat stronger in Louisiana due to the unusual nature of the vendor's lien in that state; i.e.,
the lien loses its priority if the property is conveyed to a third party by
the debtor.6 9 Notably, however, the Louisiana vendor's lien is not
without its analogue in UCC jurisdictions. Under Section 9-307(2) of
the UCC,70 a creditor who takes a purchase money security interest in
consumer goods and perfects without filing can lose rights to those
goods if the purchasing consumer sells them to another consumer.
71
Although the secured creditor may protect him or herself by filing,
this option may be uneconomical in the case of sales of small appliances and personal household items.72 Thus, a secured creditor under
the UCC is entitled to protection similar to a secured creditor under
Louisiana law.
Section 9-307(1) of the UCC 73 presents another analogue. Even
though perfected by filing, the secured party's purchase money security interest is not protected when the debtor sells to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business. Thus, the possibility that a debtor could
by disposing of secured goods destroy the vendor's lien is not unique
to civil law jurisdictions.
B.

Fuentes' Strict Adversary HearingRequirements

In interpreting the familiar maxim that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time
68. Mentschikoff cites the report of a bank collection officer who in 1972 attempted
80 automobile repossessions in approximately 13,000 loans. The bank ordinarily threatened repossession in an attempt to get the loans current, and did not actually attempt
repossession until after a 90-day default. The collection officer's 80 attempts resulted in
only 45 repossessions. The other 35 automobiles had been successfully secreted. Id.
at 779 n. 35.
69. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. art. 3228 (1960).
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-307(2) (1974).
71. Id.
72. One practitioner, who represents a large department store chain and other consumer creditors, indicated that most retail sellers would not perfect their security interests on small items if they had to file to do so. Interview with James C. Middlebrooks,
of Shidler, McBroom, Gates & Baldwin, in Seattle, Washington, May 19, 1975.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-307(l) (1974).
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and in a meaningful manner, 7 4 the Fuentes Court enunciated fairly
stringent requirements. Notice and an opportunity to be heard must
75
be given before state seizure, even if only a nonfinal deprivation, of
"any significant property interest." 76 Such a property interest includes
continued use and possession, 7 7 under a conditional sales contract, of
78
all goods, whether or not necessities of life.

The Fuentes Court noted that some "extraordinary situations"
might justify postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure.79
Such situations, however, were indeed limited and required narrowly

drawn statutory schemes not present in Fuentes.8 0 In all other situations, some form of notice and hearing was required. The Court noted

that costs in time, effort and expense would result, but felt the costs
81
were outweighed by the constitutional rights protected.
Assuming, arguendo, that Fuentes were the only remedy available

to the secured creditor, several problems are presented. An adversary
hearing would be required in every case, despite the fact that in the
vast majority of instances the debtor would have no affirmative de83
fense 8 2 sufficient to forestall or prevent the impending repossession.
The additional costs of such hearings (which no doubt would be indirectly borne by debtors) would in most cases unnecessarily increase

the size of the deficiency judgments awarded against the defaulting
debtor. Deficiency judgments would also be enlarged because of the
diminution in value of "wasting assets"'8 4 between notice and hearing.
Again, this result is in most cases an unnecessary one, since the vast

407 U.S. at 80, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1964).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1970).
Id.
78. Id. at 88-89.
79. See note 32 supra.
80. In the Pennsylvania scheme, the creditor had only to file an affidavit of the value
of the property; in the Florida scheme, only to assert that he or she was lawfully entitled
to possession. Neither statute met the requirements set out by the Court for summary,
ex parte seizures. Id.
81. 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
82. Typically available defenses are fraud and breach of warranty. Mentschikoff.
supra note 62, at 775-76.
83. Id. at 775-78.
84. Automobiles and most consumer goods are wasting assets, since each passing
day of consumer use presumably lowers their resale value and exposes the goods to risk
of accident. Id. at 779.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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majority of debtors will lose at the hearing, most often by default. 85
The increased number of hearings would impose additional burdens
on an already overburdened court system, resulting in higher taxes to
be paid by the general public.8 6 Finally, if prior notice of repossession.
induces an increased number of persons to secrete or transfer their
goods,87 or to "skip" the jurisdiction, the resultant financial injury to
the creditor would undoubtedly be reflected in higher credit charges to
all debtors where allowed under existing usury limitations, and thus
foreclose some consumers from obtaining credit. 88 Other retailers
would increase the purchase price paid by both cash and credit customers or simply deny credit altogether to consumers whose credit
worthiness is marginal.
The state of affairs presented by Fuentes, particularly the troublesome, time-consuming and expensive nature of adversary hearings,
encourages many creditors to utilize the self-help provisions of Section
9-503 of the UCC.89 Recognizing this likelihood, Justice White commented in his Fuentes dissent: 90
[Fuentes] represents no more than ideological tinkering with state
law. It would appear that creditors could withstand attack under today's opinion simply by making clear in the controlling credit instruments that they may retake possession without. . . resort to judicial
process at all.

85. Attorney Middlebrooks, supra note 72, indicated that most defaulting debtors
simply lack the funds to meet their payments, therefore the creditor usually obtains the
relief requested at hearing, and the added costs of such adversary hearings must be
borne, albeit indirectly, by debtors.
86. Mentschikoff, supra note 62, at 769.
87. See note 68 supra.
88. Such foreclosure may be problematical, however, since the economics of the
marketplace, particularly the movement of interest rates, undoubtedly has far more to
do with the availability of credit than the indirect imposition of repossession costs on the
general consuming public. See Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir.
1974).
89. Section 9-503 of the UCC, WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-503 (-14), provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace ....
The effects of self-help repossession on the debtor are basically the same as those of
the replevin procedure held invalid in Fuentes.In either situation, the debtor is deprived
of his or her possessory interest in goods without prior notice and opportunity to be
heard. For further discussion, see Comment, Self-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack, the Legislative Response, and the Economic Implications, 62 GEo. L.J.
273,288-92(1973).
90. 407 U.S. at 102.
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Self-Help Repossession

Justice White's incisive commentary prompts one to consider just
what sort of self-help repossession may be privately agreed upon by
use of controlling credit instruments. Yet, an initial question worthy
of consideration is whether the self-help remedy is available at all.
Such consideration requires an analysis of the "state action" concept
in the context of Article Nine of the UCC.
1.

State action

The complexity of the UCC repossession provisions, often accentuated by additional individual state law requirements not patterned
after the UCC provisions, 9' has prompted much recent litigation over
the question whether "self-help" repossession under the UCC constitutes state action. 92 Two basic arguments have been urged for finding
state action in self-help repossession cases: (a) the authorization or
encouragement argument; and (b) the public or state function argument.9 3 Although the matter is far from settled, 94 recent federal rulings on state action issues in Article Nine and analogous contexts sug-

91. For example, in Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974), Judge Hufstedler, dissenting, noted that
the auto-secured credit industry in California was heavily regulated by statute. She
maintained that such regulation combined with self-help repossession so involved the
state as to constitute state action. 492 F.2d at 340. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-84.4
(West Supp. 1975); CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (West Supp. 1975).
A similar argument was made in Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945
(W.D. Mich. 1974). In finding state action, the district judge stated the role of the Michigan Secretary of State in issuing new certificates of title for repossessed automobiles was
qualitatively the same as the role of the clerk under the Florida replevin statute in
Fuentes and was equivalent to ratification of the seizure by the state. Id. at 972. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.236a(a), (d) (1970). For further discussion, see Burke &
Reber, State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19-23 (1973).
92. Courts failed to find state action in Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th
Cir. 1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); and Bichel Optical Laboratories
v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973). Contra, Watson v. Branch
County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) rev'd sub. nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, supra;
cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
93. The Supreme Court has found state action present where the state authorized
use of its courts to enforce private racially discriminatory acts, see, e.g., Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (restrictive land convenants); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (restrictive land convenants); where a state constitution encouraged pri-
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gest that self-help repossession under Section 9-503 is not state ac95
tion.
a. The authorizationargument. It has been argued that the creditor
using repossession remedies sanctioned by statute is clothed with the
authority of state law.9 6 This argument was presented in Adams v.
Egley, 97 in which defendant secured creditor utilized summary self-

help procedures permitted by California statutes to repossess plaintiff
debtor's automobile.9 8 The federal district court's holding that such
proceedings amounted to state action 99 was reversed by a divided
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sub nom. Adams v. Southern California First National Bank. 0 0 The Ninth Circuit Court majority in

Adams reasoned that the California statutes merely codified previously existing private remedies and did not thereby clothe the creditor with the authority of state law. 10 1

Judge Byrne, dissenting from the panel opinion in Adams, 10 2 reavate acts violative of the federal constitution, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(state constitution authorizing private discrimination in the rental and sale of housing);
and where state officers and private persons allegedly cooperated to violate the civil
rights of others, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
The Court has also found state action present where a private person performed acts
traditionally public or governmental in nature, see, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (city maintained a privately bequeathed park for whites only); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (racially exclusive political association ran the only effective primary election); and where a state official joined private persons in allegedly unconstitutional conduct, see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(racially exclusive private restaurant operated in public building and financially related
to other public activities in complex).
94. The Court denied certiorari in Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973) (no state action in self-help repossession). 419 U.S. 1006
(1974).
95. See note 92 supra.
96. See generally Burke & Reber, supranote 91, at 12-16.
97. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
98. See CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9503-04 (West Supp. 1975).
99. Support for this argument was found in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), in which the Supreme Court found state action in private housing discrimination
authorized by a provision in the California constitution. 387 U.S. at 381. The California
constitutional provision effectively repealed state open housing laws and, although it did
not require discrimination in the sale and rental of housing, the Court felt it would "significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations." Id. Similarly, the
district court in Adams felt that the self-help repossession provisions of the California
Code encouraged private repossession and sale and thereby involved the state. 338 F.
Supp. at 617-18.
100. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
101. The court also relied on Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972),
and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), to find the absence
of the necessary "symbiotic relationship" between the secured party's actions and the
statutory scheme. 492 F.2d at 331.
102. Id.at338.
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soned that state action was present under Reitman v. Mulkey.10 3
04
Judge Hufstedler, dissenting from denial of hearing en banc,1
argued that the complex and pervasive California statutory scheme
governing repossession of automobiles supported a finding of state action under the "authorization" and "symbiotic relationship" rationales. 105
In Turner v. Impala Motors,10 6 a post-Mitchell case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals echoed the Ninth Circuit Court's holding in
Adams that the mere finding of some degree of state involvement was
insufficient to constitute state action: 107 the level of involvement must
be "significant." 10 8 The Turner court stated that Section 9-503 of the
UCC was simply permissive; the state exercised no control or compulsion over the creditor's decision to repossess.1 0 9 In response to the
argument that the mere existence of the statute might encourage selfhelp, the Turner court suggested that, as a practical matter, creditor
decisions to repossess by self-help were principally influenced by economic factors, not formal legal considerations.' 1 0
103. 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see note 99 supra.
104. 492 F.2d at 340.
105. This argument has recently been undermined by the Supreme Court's holding
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
106. 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974).
107. Most courts have found weaknesses in the authorization argument and have
declined to find sufficient state action. In Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23
(N.D. Cal. 1972), the court stated:
It is difficult to imagine any statutory provision that does not, in some way, control human relationships. To say, as plaintiff seems to contend, that all human behavior which conforms to statutory requirements is "State action" or is "under
color of State law" would far exceed not only what the framers of the Civil Rights
Act ever intended but common sense as well.
Oiler involved repossession of plaintiffs automobile under terms of a conditional
sales contract. Plaintiff relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), providing for equal rights of
citizens when a deprivation is accomplished under state law. The court found, however.
that the defendant bank's repossession under authority of California statutes was not
"under color of State law"; since the bank was not a governmental agency, no government officials acted with the bank in the matter of repossession, and the authority to
repossess was based on a contract right judicially approved prior to the adoption of the
statutes in question.
108. 503 F.2d at 609.
109. Turner was decided shortly after another post-Mitchell decision by a district
court in the Sixth Circuit. Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D.
Mich. 1974). Using the state function argument discussed infra, the district court found
state action in automobile repossession and resale and, upon balancing, determined that
by authorizing self-help repossession the State had sanctioned abuses of corporate
power and failed to accommodate the debtor's interests. The court especially noted a
lack of court supervision and of any simple procedure by which the creditor could be
put to his or her proof.
I10. 503 F.2d at 611.
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b. The public or state function argument. The public or state function theory deems private action equivalent to state action when the
private person is performing a function traditionally that of the state,
or is performing the activity as an agent of the state and therefore subject to its constitutional limitations.'1 '
The state function theory has prevailed in cases involving landlord's
private seizures, pursuant to authorizing statute, from persons failing
to make rental payments. For example, in Hall v. Garson,12 a landlady's statutory seizure of a television set to enforce her lien was
viewed as a function traditionally performed in Texas by public offi11 3
cials. Thus, the landlady was "clothed with state authority.
The state function theory has not fared as well, however, in repossession cases concerning secured parties. Courts can generally distinguish self-help repossession by secured parties, reasoning that the right
of repossession is based on the long-standing private right of contract
which provides the secured creditor (in contrast to an unsecured
landlord) with a property right in the goods." 4 For example, in Gibbs
v. Titelman," 5 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the theory
that by permitting self-help repossession, Pennsylvania had abdicated
to private individuals the traditional state function of deciding "that
one's rights are superior to another's" and carrying "out that decision
by seizing another's property." 1 6

111.

See Clark & Landers, supra note 33, at 377.

112.

430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). Hall was remanded for trial and appealed again

to the Fifth Circuit Court on a challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas landlord
lien statute. On the second appeal, the court held the statute violative (f the fourteenth

amendment. 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
113. 430 F.2d at 443. The court reasoned in dictum that:
[T] he execution of a lien, whether a traditional security interest or a quasi writ
of attachment or judgment lien has in Texas traditionally been the function of the
Sheriff or constable. Thus [the statute] vests in the landlord and his agents authority that is normally exercised by the state and historically has been a state function.
Id. at 439 (footnotes omitted).
114.

Borseth v. Raden, Civ. No. 777-523, Wash. Super. Ct. King County, filed

March 4, 1974 (Oral Decision at 9-10). In a succinct and well-reasoned opinion holding Washington's Innkeepers Laws (WASH. REv. CODE chs. 60.64-.66 (1974)) unconstitutional, the Borseth court found that the statutorily authorized private execution of
landlord liens constituted state action since that function had been performed by the
sheriff.
115.
116.

502F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1113. Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974)

(breaking into debtor's home to repossess a washing machine held not state action under

919

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 901, 1975

A recent United States Supreme Court decision, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,' 17 suggests that it is most unlikely the Court
would hold Article Nine self-help repossession to be state action. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that termination of utility
service by a publicly regulated private utility did not constitute state
action. He stated that even though the utility was heavily regulated
and enjoyed at least a partial monopoly, utility service did not constitute a public function since it was not a service traditionally con1 18
sidered an obligation of the state.
These cases suggest that Article Nine self-help repossession will in
the future, as now, be considered only a private remedy. It is unlikely
that a state action argument will succeed under either of the above
theories." 9 Consequently, absent Mitchell, secured creditors would
increasingly turn to self-help to avoid the burden of proceeding by
means of a Fuentes hearing.
2.

The UCC's repossessionscheme

Although Section 9-507 of the UCC by its terms does not require
the creditor to post a bond prior to repossession, the debtor with a
right to continued possession may immediately request a mandatory

Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970)); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (Ist Cir. 1974) (action against banks by depositors whose
deposits had been set off against indebtedness arising from use of bank credit cards.
not state action).
117. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
118. Id.at 353.
119. Even if repossession or resale pursuant to §§ 9-503 & 9-504 of the UCC were
held to be state action and invalid on due process grounds, creditors might be able to
insert a waiver clause in the security agreement. Two recent cases, D.H. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972), and Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), indicate that
an informed, voluntary waiver of due process rights may be constitutionally valid. See
generally Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the SniadachFuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 79 CASE & COMMENT 24, 36 (1974).
It is suggested that such clauses should state clearly both the debtor's rights and the
waiver of them and be printed in large and conspicuous type so as to create the presumption that the debtor was fully aware of the waiver. In order to avoid the appearance
of adhesion, the creditor might give consideration for the waiver, such as reducing the
interest rate. See Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the
Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 23, 43 (1972). See also
Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971), in which the court held a waiver
of warranty to be ineffectual unless explicitly negotiated between buyer and seller and
set forth with particularity showing the qualities and characteristics of fitness which are
to be waived. Id. at 196, 484 P.2d at 386. The case dealt with a printed disclaimer of
warranty in the purchase of a new automobile.
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injunction restoring possession to the debtor on such terms as a court
of equity may decree. 20 The secured party must exercise reasonable
care in preservation of the collateral upon repossession 2 1 and must

dispose of it in a commercially reasonable manner after proper notification of the time and place of sale. 122 The debtor may redeem the
property prior to its disposition 123 unless the right has been waived
after default. 124 Violation by the creditor of any UCC provision is
125
grounds for damages.

While these provisions appear to provide appropriate guidelines for
resolving secured creditor-debtor conflicts, in practice they may be
inequitable. Some commentators suggest that most consumers are
unaware of their rights and will not try to challenge the creditor's
right to declare default and repossess, even when the creditor's position may be tenuous. 2 6 Of course where the consumer is aware of his
or her rights and insists upon asserting them, the possibility of breach
of the peace, inherent in any self-help repossession scheme, looms

large.

120. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-507 (1974). It has been argued that the existence of
legal service programs in poverty areas, and the continuing tendency in consumer legislation to add attorney's fees as an item of damage, make the right to request immediate
restoration of possession a real, and not a theoretical one. Mentschikoff, supra note 62,
at 782 n.41.
121. UCC § 9-207; WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-207 (1974). Protection of the secured party's interest in the collateral is generally realized through the repossession and
resale provisions of the Code. Id. §§ 9-503, 9-504, 9-505. While WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.9-501(1974) provides generally for the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment, §
62A.9-501(1) states that in the case of purchase money security interests in consumer
goods, the debtor will not be liable for any deficiency if the secured party has disposed
of the collateral under § 62A.9-504. But see Lew v. Goodfellow Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 6 Wn. App. 226,231,492 P.2d 258,262 (1971), v'herein the Washington court held
that a deficiency judgment is allowed when a secured party judicially forecloses a security interest.
122. UCC § 9-504; WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-504 (1974).
123. UCC § 9-506; WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-506 (1974).
124. Id.
125. If the secured party. . . behaves in bad faith or in a commercially unreasonable manner or violates any. . . provisions of the Code, including taking possession where there is no default, he may be enjoined and ordered to behave in an
appropriate way with appropriate damages to the debtor, including, in the case
of consumer goods, penalty damages.
Mentschikoff, supra note 62, at 774.
126. See, e.g., E. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 161-67 (1963). On the other hand,
Justice White indicated that he was willing to trust the UCC drafters in fairly allocating
the various burdens. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 103.
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Breach of the peace

The secured party has a right to repossess without judicial process
only if it can be accomplished without breach of the peace.12 7 This
requirement attempts to insure that recovery will be conducted in an
orderly and peaceable fashion, but its exact limits are still undergoing
development.
The Washington Supreme Court spoke to the breach of the peace
issue in Burgin v. Universal Credit Co.,1 2 8 in which the court gave the
12 9
following instructions:
[I]f buyer is in personal possession of the [collateral] and protests
against such repossession and attempts to obstruct the seller in doing
so,. . . it becomes the duty of the seller to proceed no further in such
attempted repossession and to resort to legal process to enforce his
right of possession ....
In this case, physical resistance was sufficient to create a duty on the
seller to retreat or risk breach of the peace.
It appears, however, that less than physical resistance will suffice.
In Morris v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 130 the Ohio Supreme
Court held that when three of creditor's agents physically confronted
debtor's son on the debtor's premises and seized a rotary mower found
on the ground near a tool shed, despite the son's requests to desist
their repossession or depart the premises, they breached the peace.
The court found it irrelevant that the son failed to lash out or that no
assault occurred; it was sufficient that an act likely to produce violence had occurred.13 1 Similarly, a refusal to permit entry into the
place where the collateral is kept will likely preclude self-help repossession. 132
127. UCC § 9-503; WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-503 (1974).
"A breach of the peace is a public offense done by violence, or one causing or likely
to cause an immediate disturbance of public order." I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 116 (1965).
128. 2 Wn. 2d 364, 98 P.2d 291 (1940).
129. Id. at 373, 98 P.2d at 295.
130. 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970).
131. Similarly, in Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler, I Wn. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651
(1970), the court held that the fact that a sheriff accompanied the seller to the site of the
secured goods when the sheriff lacked proper papers to authorize a repossession
"amounted to constructive force, intimidation and oppression constituting a breach of
the peace ....
" Id. at 757, 463 P.2d at 655. It was sufficient that the buyer objected to
the taking, although he offered no physical resistance.
132. Mentschikoff, supra note 62, at 772.

922

Creditors' Rights
Nonetheless, it remains unclear what acts are sufficient to constitute
refusal or how strenuous objections must be. 133 Since the UCC
"makes no attempt to articulate the standards for determining whether
34
the repossession can be accomplished without breach-of-the-peace,"'
the field is open for seller's agents to push the breach of the peace limitation to its farthest extreme in order to avoid the necessity of pro35
ceeding under the stringent Fuentes judicial repossession standards.1
D.

The Mitchell Compromise-A Needed Alternative

If Mitchell standards are implemented in numerous states, presumably more creditors would be willing to abstain from self-help repossession and proceed ex parte under the less onerous judicial procedures authorized by Mitchell. Since public policy favors minimizing
breach of the peace, such a result should be viewed favorably.
Under a strict reading of Mitchell, the following provisions must
appear in the underlying statutory scheme for it to constitutionally
balance the conflicting interests 13 6 of the creditor and debtor, so as to
justify an ex parte proceeding:
(1) The complaint or affidavit must contain specific factual alle137
gations that the applicant is entitled to the goods;

133. Clarity is also lacking where repossessions have not involved objections or refusals. For example, in Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934), creditor's employees merely entered the house through what they claimed was an unlocked
door and repossessed a piano while the debtor was out. Although the contract involved
allowed for self-help repossession, the court held that there was no right to enter in that

fashion. The court in Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 29, 254
N.E.2d 683, 687 (1970), stated in dictum that a creditor should not attempt to enter any
private structure without express consent of the party in charge. But in Cherno v. Bank
of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277,282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1967), the court upheld the use of a sur-

reptitiously obtained duplicate key to enter the place where the goods were kept since
the action was neither violent nor disturbing.
134. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN.
L. REv. 205, 211 (1962).

135. In Washington this tendency may be mitigated to some extent by the inability
of creditors to obtain deficiency judgments for consumer goods after repossessing by selfhelp. See note 121 supra. This restriction is found only in Washington. See R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-501(1) (1971).
136. See Part II-A supra.
137. 416 U.S. at 605-06; LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 3501 (1960). The Mitchell dissenters stated that, although the Louisiana affidavit standardized form called for more information that the forms in prior cases, such ex parte allegations were still "hardly a
substitute for prior hearing, for they test no more than the strength of the applicant's
own belief in his rights." 416 U.S. at 632, quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 83.
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(2) the applicant must post a protective bond before the writ can
issue, and even then it will issue only on the signature of a
judge1 38 after determining the existence of the debt, lien and
deliquency;1 39 and
(3) after issuance, the debtor must have the right to post a counterbond to regain possession or to obtain an early hearing on
1 40
the merits of seizure.
Such a statutory scheme provides the needed compromise in the spectrum of creditor remedies. The creditor avoids the problems presented
by the procedure contemplated in Fuentes,14 1 and the inducement of
repossession by state official action protects the debtor from the problems of overreaching inherent in repossession by a creditor under the
UCC. When the occasion arises in which the debtor has a valid defense to repossession, a remedy is readily available in the form of an
early adversary hearing.

III.

THE WASHINGTON APPROACH TO SECURED
TRANSACTION DISPUTES-PRESENT AND
PROPOSED

Washington has adopted Fuentes standards in the context of prejudgment attachment. 42 Although this approach can arguably be extended to cover the entire field of prejudgment remedies, in situations
138.
The Mitchell dissenters viewed this difference as of no constitutional significance. They stated that the issuing functionary did no more than ascertain the formal
sufficiency of the allegations. 416 U.S. at 632.
139. The Mitchell Court found these matters were especially susceptible of documentary proof. 416 U.S. at 617-18. The statutes in Fuentes had only demanded an allegation that the property was "wrongfully detained." The Fuentes Court considered such
a generalized "fault" standard ill-suited for preliminary ex parte determinations. 407
U.S. at 79. The Mitchell dissenters took issue with the distinction between the two standards stating that the issues in both Mitchell and Fuentes were the same: "the creditorvendor needed only to establish his security interest and the debtor-vendee's default."
416 U.S. at 633.
140. There are several possible bases for dissolution of a writ at this point, e.g.,
prematurity, novation, payment, improper process, faulty pleading, inadequate surety,
lack ofjui:isdiction and improper parties. Brief of the Att'y General of Louisiana at 9,
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
141. See notes 82-86 and accompanying text supra.
142. Rogoski v. Hammond, 9 Wn. App. 500, 513 P.2d 285 (1973); Seattle Credit
Bureau v. Hibbitt, 7 Wn. App. 219, 499 P.2d 92 (1972). Washington's attachment statutes are found in WASH. REv. CODE ch. 7.12 (1974). Attachment is a provisional, auxiliary remedy, created by statute, whereby a creditor obtains a contingent lien on prop-
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involving both secured and unsecured obligations, 143 no Washington
court has explicitly reached this result. Nor does any Washington decision or statute provide Mitchell-type safeguards in the context of
secured transactions. It is proposed that a statute constitutional under
Mitchell be enacted in Washington to govern secured transactions

generally, leaving the Fuentes standards to govern prejudgment attachment and garnishment.
A.

The Fuentes-Rogoski Model

In Rogoski v. Hammond,144 Judge Horowitz saved Washington's
prejudgment attachment statute from constitutional attack 145 by read-

erty of the alleged'debtor, keeping this property available to satisfy any judgment which
the creditor may recover against the debtor; it is in the nature of an anticipatory execution levied on the property of the debtor. The remedy is designed to prevent evasion of
the claims of creditors by fraudulent, absconding, nonresident or concealing debtors. H.
OLECK, CREDITOR-DEBTOR LAW § 8, at 30 (1953). In the attachment situation, the creditor usually does not have a pre-existing interest in the particular piece of property attached. Thus attachment is primarily a remedy for the previously unsecured creditor.
See Rogoski, 9 Wn. App. at 513, 513 P.2d at 293 (Williams, J., concurring).
143. Note that the Court used Fuentes in Di-Chem, which involved a garnishment
proceeding, and that Fuentes itself was a replevin action. 407 U.S. at 71.
144. 9 Wn. App. 500, 513 P.2d 285 (1973). The main issue in Rogoski was whether
due process objections to prejudgment attachment based on WASH. REV. CODE §
7.12.020(10)'(1974) were overcome by preliminary use of show cause hearing procedures under § 2.28.150. In Rogoski, plaintiff creditor obtained an order directing defendant debtor to show cause why a writ of attachment against defendant's property
should not issue. Plaintiff was proceeding under § 7.12.020(10) on the basis of rent allegedly owing under a written lease. Defendant claimed the-proposed attachment violated due process for failure to provide notice and an opportunity for judicial hearing
to determine the probable validity of the plaintiff's claim. Section 7.12.020(10) provides:
The writ of attachment shall be issued by the clerk of court in which the action is
pending; . . . the klaintiff . . . shall make and file with the clerk an affidavit
showing...
(10) That the object for which the action is brought is to recover on a contract,
express or implied.
See Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wn. App. 971,497 P.2d 250 (1972), holding § 7.12.020(10) violative of due process as applied.
145. Washington's attachment statutes, like its replevin statutes, do not provide for
prejudgment notice and hearing. Thus, they are constitutionally deficient because all the
attachment grounds are not so narrowly drawn as to constitute "extraordinary situations" within the Fuentes exceptions. See Rogoski v. Hammond, 9 Wn. App. 500, 513
P.2d 285 (1973) (in which the court held that WASH. REv. -CODE § 7.12.020(10) did not
constitute an extraordinary circumstance); note 32 supra. The court of appeals, however, felt that this could be overcome by the preliminary use of a show cause hearing
procedure under WASH. REv. CODE § 2.28.150, which provides that a court may adopt
any suitable process or mode of proceeding to carry a statute into effect. Rogoski, 9
Wn. App. at 504, 513 P.2d at 288.
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ing into it the requirements set forth in Fuentes.146 Under Rogoski,
the taking cannot be summary in nature; there is no possibility that the
state's power would be unilaterally invoked by a creditor on the basis
of an untested and conclusory affidavit.' 47 Rather, a judge or magistrate will determine in an adversary contest the probability that the
48
plaintiff creditor's case will succeed.'
The procedure set forth in Rogoski seems especially appropriate for
the attachment remedy, which is most often used by unsecured creditors. In such situations it would seem more appropriate to require
prior notice and hearing even if Mitchell-type safeguards were available, since the creditor would not have a property interest in the goods
attached. Yet, it seems inappropriate that these stringent procedures
apply equally to secured transaction disputes.
B.

The ConstitutionalInadequacy of Washington Replevin Statutes

Washington's replevin statutes 49 are similar in effect to the Louisiana sequestration statutes reviewed in Mitchell, in that both procedures provide that the property at issue be held by a state official pend146. Judge Horowitz, in writing the majority opinion, set out the essential ingredients of notice and hearing required by due process in prejudgment attachment. The minimum requirements are: (1)timely and adequate notice on the probable validity of the
creditor's claim which states the basis for the claim and allows the debtor adequate time
to prepare for the hearing; (2) an independent and impartial decisionmaker; (3) the right
to appear personally at the hearing, with or without retained counsel; (4) the right at the
hearing to confront and cross-examine any adverse witness and to present evidence and
oral argument in support of one's claim or defense; and (5) the right to a decision based

on applicable legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. Reasons for the determination and an indication of the evidence relied upon should be stated, but formal findings are not required. 9 Wn. App. at 506, 513 P.2d at 289.
Judge Horowitz also stated that courts should evaluate the creditors' chances of prevailing in a trial on the merits. Id. at 507. 513 P.2d at 290.
147. This was of concern to both the Fuentes and Mitchell Courts. The Court in
Mitchell stated: "Mitchell was not at the unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court
functionaries. The Louisiana law provides for judicial control of the process from beginning to end." 416 U.S. at 616. See also Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 83, where the Court expressed its disapproval of ex parte allegations which test "no more than the strength of
the applicant's own belief in his rights," and yet are the unsupported bases on which
clerks issue prejudgment writs.
148. It is not yet settled exactly what standard the plaintiff must meet in these preliminary determinations. In Mitchell, Justice Powell speaks of establishing the "probability that [the creditor's] case will succeed." 416 U.S. at 609. But see Bell v. Burson.
402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971), in which the Court held that plaintiff's drivers license could
not be suspended without due process, in which the standard for the required hearing
was whether there was a "reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against
him ....
149. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.64 (1974). Washington's statutes are supplemental in
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ing a trial on the merits. 150 Both statutes provide for the creditor to take

possession if the debtor does not regain possession by counterbond,
but the goods may not be sold until final judgment on the merits. 15 1

To trigger replevin a Washington plaintiff creditor must submit an
affidavit stating the actual value of the property, 15 2 claiming its delivery, 153 showing that he or she is owner of the property claimed or lawfully entitled to possession of it and that the property is wrongfully
detained by the defendant.1 54 Upon receipt of the affidavit and a
double value security bond, the sheriff is directed to take possession of
55
the property and retain it in custody.'
Although in practice a Washington judge sees the affidavit and
signs the writ before issuance by the clerk, 56 there is no statutory
requirement in Washington like that in the Louisiana statute, reviewed
in Mitchell, that specific factual allegations be made to support a judicial finding of the probable validity of the plaintiffs claim. Indeed, a
Washington judge by statute can do little more than check the pro

forma sufficiency of the documents. Nor do the Washington provisions allow the defendant to move to dissolve plaintiff's writ prior to a
57
trial on the merits.'

The debtor in a Washington replevin proceeding is clearly not accorded the safeguards found necessary by the Mitchell Court to justify
ex parte proceedings. A fortiori, the statutory scheme is constitu58
tionally infirm under Fuentes.
nature, only requiring the filing of a suit to recover possession of personal property before a writ of replevin is issued. Id. § 7.64.010. This appears to have been the case in
Louisiana also since Grant Co. was requesting sequestration of the merchandise pending
the outcome of its underlying suit. 416 U.S. at 602.
150. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.64.030 (1974). The writ issued in Mitchell stated in part
that "the Constable of this court (shall] sequester and take into his possession the articles of merchandise described in the foregoing petition." 416 U.S. at 602.
151. See LA. CODE CIv. PRO. arts 3510, 3576 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.64
.050-.090 (1974).
152. WASH. REV. CODE'§ 7.64.020 (1974).
153. Id. § 7.64.010.
154. Id. § 7.64.020.
155. Id. § 7.64.030.
156. Interview with Mary Duckering, King County Clerk's Office, in Seattle, Washington, May 15, 1975.
157. By contrast, the Louisiana statutes in Mitchell required the creditor to make
specific factual allegations in the complaint or affidavit examined by the judge, and allowed the debtor to regain possession by posting a bond or challenging the repossession
in an immediate proceeding to dissolve the writ. 416 U.S. at 605-07.
158. Washington's replevin statutes not only fail to provide for prior notice and an
opportunity for hearing, but neither are they narrowly drawn to allow for prehearing
seizures only in extraordinary situations. See note 32 supra.
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Curing Washington's Replevin Statutes

There are basically two ways to correct the unconstitutionality of
Washington's replevin statutes. First, a Washington appellate court
confronted with a constitutional attack on the statutes could follow
the lead of Rogoski by exerting its jurisdiction under R.C.W. §
2.28.150159 to adopt judicial procedures which complement the statutes and provide the necessary safeguards. Fuentes-Rogoski requirements of due process could be required in all transactions, secured

and unsecured; 160 such an approach, however, would impose onerous
and unwarranted burdens on the secured creditor. 161 Preferable would

be judicial imposition of Mitchell-type safeguards for secured transaction disputes.
As an alternative to judicially imposed safeguards, Washington

could adopt a Mitchell-type statute to govern secured transactions.
The following statute is suggested as part of a scheme permissible
under Mitchell:
A writ of replevin may be granted by a judge without written or
oral notice to the adverse party or his or her attorney only if, from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified complaint, the probable
validity of
(1) the balance of the debt owing to the applicant,
(2) the existence of a valid, enforceable security agreement between the alleged debtor and the applicant entitling the secured
party to possession upon default,
(3) the applicant's statement that in his or her informed belief the
applicant has complied with all contractual agreements,
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.150 (1974); see note 145 supra.
160. The requirements a replevin statute must meet when the Fuentes extraordinary
circumstances are not present have been previously discussed in this law review. Briefly,
prior notice and an opportunity for hearing must be provided before seizure of the debtor's goods under nonextraordinary circumstances. See Comment. Creditor-Debtor
Law: Procedural Due Process and Washington's Prejudgment Seizure Procedures, 48
WASH. L. REV. 646 (1973).
The Rogoski court used the rationale of the United States Supreme Court prejudgment garnishment and replevin cases to determine its due process requirements of notice and hearing. Likewise, Rogoski's requirements can be used as guidelines in Washington replevin statutes to provide adequate notice and hearing before allowing replevy
of property. If this is done, it appears that Washington requirements will be more stringent than Mitchell's: the Washington procedure would require that the opportunity
for a procedure similar to full-scale litigation be extended in advance of every trial on
the merits, whereas under its statutory procedure, Mitchell requires only an ex parte
showing to the judge in each instance.
161. These burdens, and their undesirability, are discussed in Part Il-B
supra.
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(4) the claim of default on the part of the alleged debtor, and
(5) that it is within the adverse party's power fraudulently to
convey or abscond with the property during the pendency of
these hearings,
clearly appears:
Provided, That before any writ shall issue, an action to recover possession of the personal property shall be initiated and a bond shall be
filed by the applicant, the amount of which shall be double the value
of the secured property as stated in the affidavit, or such greater
amount as set by the court, and, provided further, That the alleged
debtor is entitled to immediate repossession of the property pending
trial by furnishing security for the satisfaction of any judgment which
may be entered against the debtor.
Every writ of replevin granted without notice to the adverse party
shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed
forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record; shall state why the
writ was issued without notice; and shall expire by its terms within
such time as the court fixes, unless within such time so fixed, the writ,
for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party
against whom the writ is directed shall agree by a statement of record
that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for any such
extension shall be entered of record.
In cases where a writ of replevin is granted without notice, a challenge to the writ by the alleged debtor shall be set for hearing at the
earliest possible time and take precedence over all matters except
prior matters of the same character; and when the challenge comes on
for hearing the party who obtained the writ shall defend its issuance
and, if he or she does not do so, the court shall dissolve the writ. On
two (2) days notice to the party who obtained the writ without notice,
or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the
adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification,
and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such
motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
The proposed statute incorporates the following significant features
from Mitchell: (1) specific factual allegations must be made in the
affidavit; (2) a judge examines the affidavit and may issue the writ
only after determining the probable validity of the applicant's claim;
(3) a protective bond is posted before issuance of the writ; and (4)
provision is made for an immediate challenge of the writ, or repossession by counterbond of the debtor.
The proposed statute also provides for a record which can be used
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in later proceedings. The challenge procedure allows the debtor to
interpose defenses, such as breach of warranty, sufficient to warrant
return of the property pending trial on the merits.1 62 It allows for a
summary taking by the creditor 63 if the debtor has power to abscond
with the property, rather than requiring proof that he or she probably
164
will do So.
Finally, the statute gives the debtor's challenge priority status on
the court's docket.1 65 This is consistent with the emphasis in Mitchell
that "the debtor may immediately have a full hearing on the matter of
possession. . . thus cutting to a bare minimum the time of creditor or
1 66
court supervised possession."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The state of the law governing secured as well as unsecured transactions remains uncertain in many respects. It does appear, however,
that Mitchell heralds an easing of previously inflexible procedural
due process standards in the creditor-debtor area. Di-Chem does not
undercut the Court's holding in Mitchell if Justice White's reliance on
Fuentes is viewed in terms of stare decisis and supremacy; neither
does it explain, however, Mitchell's relevance or its potential use in
cases outside the narrow factual setting of Louisiana. Fuentes can now
be considered applicable in the unsecured context, and in secured
transactions in states which have not adopted a Mitchell-modeled statutory scheme.
The use of Mitchell's balancing analysis in self-help repossession
cases seemingly will not be widespread, due to the courts' unwilling-

162. If the debtor's challenge is successful, extra costs and attorney's fees should be
chargeable to the creditor.
163. A summary taking is one without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard
afforded the debtor. See note 2 supra.
164. Similarly, the statutes in Mitchell required only a showing that it was within
the power of the debtor to abscond with the goods. See note 16 supra. There may be
times when the property is in the hands of a third party, e.g., being held under a mechanic's lien, and secure from any untoward disposition by the debtor. In such an instance.
the need for immediate repossession is not present.
165. The author realizes that the language calling for precedence over all other matters conflicts with identical language in Rule 65(b) of the Civil Rules for Superior Court
(Temporary Restraining Orders) after which this statute was modeled in part. It is submitted, however, that the provision is necessary to protect both creditor's and debtor's
interests and should take precedence over Rule 65(b) when the two conflict.
166. 416U.S.at6lO.
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ness to find state action in this area; should it be used, the result need
no longer be a foregone conclusion as under Fuentes. The acceptance
of Mitchell-modeled statutes will undoubtedly be forthcoming due to
the advantages of the scheme, and later testing of state statutes which
are similar to Mitchell's in some respects, but not in others, 167 should
clarify the necessity of each statutory protection and the part it plays.

Janis A. Cunningham*

167. Other statutory schemes contain bits and pieces of the elements found important in Mitchell. For example, some states provide for issuance of writs of replevin by a
judge. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 654.22 (1968); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840

(1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-586 (Supp. 1975). Some states require a creditor to state
facts in a petition showing the need for immediate issuance of the writ. See, e.g., Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 533.010 (Vernon 1953); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-586 (Supp. 1975).
*Third-year law student, University of Washington; B.S., 1973, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
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